Often, consumers are arguing that they cannot be bound to certain terms because they never saw them, or lacked a sufficient opportunity to review them, before entering into a relationship with a business. Today, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a different scenario — where a company was arguing that the terms and conditions it presented to customers were not actually part of any contractual agreement.
The case, Calderon v. Sixt Rent a Car, arises out of a familiar fact pattern. Each of the plaintiffs reserved a car in advance, before going to pick it up at a rental car agency counter. The customers each testified they presented their ID and credit card to an agent, and provided a signature using a digital device. None of the three named plaintiffs recalled reviewing any paperwork.
After each plaintiff returned their car, they were charged for hundreds of dollars of purported damage to the rental car. They then sued on behalf of a putative class, alleging that the way they were charged for damages was inconsistent with the process described in “terms and conditions” that were printed on an 8-page paper jacket that is given with keys and a “face page” — a short receipt summary of the basic reservation details (e.g., rate, dates and times, and vehicle reserved).
Sixt claimed that the only binding contractual terms were those in the “Face Page,” because each plaintiff was not on notice of the provisions in the terms and conditions in the jacket when providing his or her digital signature. Reversing a contrary district court decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that the terms and conditions contained in the jacket were indeed incorporated into the contract, under Florida, Colorado, and Arizona law, thus allowing the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims to proceed. The court affirmed the district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ Florida unfair trade and deceptive acts claims, though, because none of the named plaintiffs actually paid Sixt any money in response to their damages charges- one plaintiff successfully argued with Sixt, one plaintiff’s employer paid, and one plaintiff’s insurer and employer split the costs.
